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ing may limit this expansion. 3 The explicit language of section 7502 should
also act as a counterweight to any expansion of Curry. Indeed, the statute
could only be made more explicit by Congress specifically forbidding the
Tax Court from taking jurisdiction on the basis of equity or constructive
delivery. Such an amendment should not be necessary since Curry will
likely be the extraordinary exception.
MARK D.

A.

PERREAULT

XV. TORTS
Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

The attractive nuisance doctrine, which allows a trespassing child to
recover damages from a landowner for injuries caused by a dangerous
condition on the land,1 is an exception to the landowner's common law
duty to refrain only from intentionally engaging in willful or wanton mis-

conduct towards a trespasser.' This exception is derived from the legal
See Shipley v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1977) (court refused to consider
secondary evidence of timely mailing where petition cover bore untimely postmark).
The attractive nuisance doctrine was first outlined in Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry.,
21 Minn. 207 (1875). See also Souix City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 17 U.S. (Wall.) 657 (1873).
The Keffe court held that a landowner who maintains a dangerous condition on his land
which is "alluring" to children will be liable to children injured by that condition. 21 Minn.
at 210. In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that the landowner's act of maintaining
such a dangerous condition on the land constituted an implied invitation to children to come
on the land. Id. at 211. Therefore, the court concluded that a landowner has a duty to take
reasonable action to render such a dangerous condition harmless to trespassing children. Id.
at 212. During the early 1900's, text writers advocated abandoning the Keffe "allurement"
concept of liability in favor of treating a child trespass case as an ordinary negligence case.
Prosser, Tresspassing Children, 47 CAL. L. REv. 427, 432 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
Trepassing Children]; see Green, Landowner v. Intruder, Intruder v. Landowner: The Basis
of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MIcH. L. REv. 495, 505-13 (1923); Hudson, The TurntableDoctrine in the Federal Courts, 36 HA{v. L. REv. 826 (1923). These writers argued that liability
for a trespassing child's injury should be based on forseeability of harm and considerations
of social policy rather than the theoretical concept of allurement. Prosser, Trespassing Children, supra at 432. The drafters of the Restatement of Torts reflected this change in thinking
in the 1934 version of the Restatement. Prosser, Trespassing Children, supra, at 435; see
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 339 (1934); Note, Trespassing Children: A Study in Expanding
Liability, 20 VAND. L. REv. 139, 142-43 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Liability].
Under §339, which remains substantially unchanged in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
a child may recover damages from a landowner by meeting four requirements. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965); Prosser Trespassing Children, supra at 435-36. Prior to
recovery, a child myst prove that the condition which caused his injury posed an unreasonable risk of harm to children, that he was incapable of appreciating the risk of harm posed
by the condition, that the landowner knew or should have known that children trespassed on
the property, and that the risk of harm to a child posed by the condition outweighed its value
to the landowner. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965); Expanding Liability, supra
at 146. Many courts have adopted the 1934 Restatement's view of the attractive nuisance
doctrine. E.g. O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal.2d 729, 414 P.2d 830, 51 Cal. Rptr.
534 (1966); Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581, 111 S.E.2d 827 (1960).
2 Expanding Liability, supra note 1, at 140. The landowner's common law duty of care
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presumption that a young child lacks the ability to understand dangerous
conditions on the land and thus, should receive special protection from
such conditions.3 Since older children, like adults, are expected to understand dangerous conditions,' courts have attempted to formulate limitations based on age for the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine. 5
In furtherance of these limitations, many courts hold that children of a
certain age no longer need this special protection and are presumed to be
capable of understanding dangerous conditions.' Recently, in Hashtaniv.
Duke Power Co.,7 the Fourth Circuit considered the availability of a waiver
to such an age limitation when a child plaintiff suffers from mental retardation or mental deficiency.
Hashtani, a fourteen year old boy, and two companions trespassed on
Duke Power Company (Duke) property by climbing an electric transmission tower owned by Duke.8 While climbing the tower, one of Hashtani's
companions heard a loud crackling noise. Looking downward, the companion discovered Hashtani hanging on a lower crossbeam of the tower, unconscious and injured. Although neither of the two companions witnessed the
accident,' the nature of Hashtani's injuries indicated that he had come
to trespassers is premised on the belief that a landowner should enjoy the free use of his land
without the burden of watching for and protecting intruders. McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn.
526, 7 A.2d 437, 441 (1939); Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L. Q. 32, 3233 (1937); Prosser, Trespassing Children, supra note 1, at 428. The common law, however,
recognizes three exceptions to the landowner's limited duty of care toward trespassers. When
a landowner knows that trespassers frequently enter onto his property, the landowner must
refrain from activities which might pose a hazard to such trespassers. E.g., Southern R.R. v.
Campbell, 309 F.2d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 1962); Cheslock v. Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 157, 69 A.2d
108, 111 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 334 (1966); PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs §
58 (4th ed. 1971). In addition, where a landowner regularly engages in an activity which poses
a high degree of danger to entrants, he must exercise reasonable care to protect any entrant
against the danger posed by such an activity. E.g., Virginian Ry. v. Rose, 267 F.2d 312, 315
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 837 (1959); Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 117 N.C. 616,
23 S.E. 264, 265 (1895). Finally, if a landowner discovers the presence of a trespasser on his
property, he must exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent any harm to
that trespasser. E.g., Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Cling, 235 F.2d 445, 448 (10th Cir.
1956); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. State ex rel. Welch, 114 Md. 536, 80 A. 170, 172 (1911).
3 Prosser, Trespassing Children, supra note 1, at 429. The courts do not impose the
burden of protecting a trespassing child on the child's parents because neither custom requires nor practicality allows parents to constantly supervise their children. Id. Instead, when
a landowner places an artificial condition on his land which poses an unreasonable risk of
harm to children, the courts require the landowner to take reasonable steps to protect trespassing children from that condition. Prosser, TrespassingChildren, supra note 1, at 428-29;
ExpandingLiability, supra note 1, at 144.
SREsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF Toms § 339, comment c (1965); Expanding Liability, supra
note 1, at 146-47.
5 Prosser, TrespassingChildren,supranote 1, at 439-40; ExpandingLiability,supra note
1, at 146-47.
, See, e.g., Garrett v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 218 Ark. 575, 237 S.W.2d 895, 903
(1951); Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581, 111 S.E.2d 827, 832-33 (1960); Hanson v.
Friegang, 55 Wash. 2d 70, 345 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1959).
7 578 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 543.
Id. Hashtani's second companion, who was below Hashtani at the time of the accident,
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into contact with an electric cable while climbing the tower. Hashtani
brought suit against Duke to recover for the injuries he had received while
climbing the tower.'" At trial, Hashtani contended that the court should
apply the attractive nuisance doctrine to hold Duke liable for his injuries."
Alternatively, Hashtani claimed that under the facts of his case, Duke had
acted negligently towards Hashtani.' 2 Because of his age, Hashtani had to
rebut the North Carolina judicial presumption that a fourteen year old
child is capable of appreciating dangerous conditions before the court
would submit an attractive nuisance doctrine instruction to the jury.' 3 A
child plaintiff in North Carolina may overcome this presumption only by
proving the existence of a mental deficiency which causes the plaintiff to
lack the normal mental ability which other children of the plaintiff's age
possess." To rebut the presumption, Hashtani asserted that his poor school
looked up and saw Hashtani was on fire. Id. Hashtani, however, was unable to recall the
accident. Id.
IOSince Hashtani instituted his action in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the
district court applied the substantive law of the state in which the tort occurred, in this case,
North Carolina. 578 F.2d at 543; see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); H. GOODMiCH
& F. ScoLEs, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (4th ed. 1964).
Although Hastani waited eight years to bring his action, his claim was not barred by the
North Carolina statute of limitations. See 578 F.2d at 543. Under North Carolina law, a child
under the aqe of eighteen is under a judicial disability and must bring suit by means of a
guardian ad litem. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17 (Supp. 1977). However, the statute of
limitations 6n an action by a person under a disability does not commence until the appointment of a guardian or the disability is removed. Id. § 1-17. Since there is no requirement that
a guardian be appointed, a child may wait until his majority to begin his action without being
barred by the statute of limitations. Id., see Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126
(1964); Campbell v. Crater, 95 N.C. 156 (1886). Once a guardian is appointed or a child
reaches majority, however, a tort action must commence within three years. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-17 (Supp. 1977).
578 F.2d at 543; see text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
,2 Since Hashtani was a trespasser, the court held that he could not recover upon a
negligence theory. 578 F.2d at 546. Instead, Hashtani could recover damages only upon proof
of Duke's intentional or wanton misconduct toward him. Id. at 546; see text accompanying
note 2 supra.Since Hashtani failed to prove that Duke had engaged in such conduct, the court
dismissed Hashtani's negligence claim. 578 F.2d at 546. In addition, the court noted that even
if Duke had been negligent towards Hashtani, Hashtani still would have been barred from a
recovery because of his contributory negligence. Id., citing Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d
872 (10th Cir. 1976); Van Brooks v. Boucher, 22 N.C. App. 676, 207 S.E.2d 282 (1974); accord,
Slaysman v. Gerst, 159 Md. 292, 150 A. 728, 737 (1930); Hollman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892 (1942); Grant v. Mays, 204 Va. 41, 129 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1963).
,1 578 F.2d at 544. Under North Carolina law, a fourteen year old child is presumed to
have the reasoning ability of an adult and to have no need for the special protection from
dangerous conditions contained in the attractive nuisance doctrine. Graham v. Sandhill
Power Co., 189 N.C. 381, 127 S.E. 429, 433 (1925); accord, Hollman v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892 (1942); Grant v. Mays, 204 Va. 41, 129 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1963);
White v. Kanawha City Co., 127 W. Va. 566, 573, 34 S.E.2d 17, 20-21 (1945); cf. Slaysman v.
Gerst, 159 Md. 292, 150 A. 728, 732 (1930) (child must exercise precaution for his own safety
as ordinarily would be attributable to child of the same age).
" 578 F.2d at 544, citing Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581, 111 S.E.2d 827 (1960);
see note 13 supra.
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record demonstrated the existence of a mental deficiency. 5 In addition,
Hashtani introduced the testimony of a psychiatrist that Hashtani's mental development was equivalent to that of a thirteen year old at the time
of the accident. 6 The trial judge, finding that Hashtani had overcome the
submitted the case to the jury which returned a verdict for
presumption,
7
Hashtani.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district
court, holding that Hashtani had failed to overcome the presumption that
a fourteen year old child can appreciate dangerous conditions on the land."
The court reasoned that a mere showing of poor school performance is
insufficient to support the existence of a mental deficiency. 9 Moreover, the
court concluded that Hashtani's evidence of mental deficiency failed to
satisfy the North Carolina test for the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to a child over the age of fourteen."0 The court reasoned that
Hashtani's record in school, especially two average grades in difficult subjects, mitigated against a finding of mental deficiency." In addition, the
court discounted the efficacy of the testimony of Hashtani's psychiatrist
because of the hasty manner in which the examination was conducted and
the inconclusiveness of the psychiatrist's findings. 2 Therefore, the court
concluded that there was no basis on which the jury could have found that
Hashtani suffered from a mental deficiency and that Duke should have
"* 578 F.2d at 544-45. Hashtani had failed one grade while in elementary school but had
earned average grades in many of his school courses. Id. at 545.

16 Id.

17Id. at 543.
" Id. at 545-46.
" Id. at 544, citing Grube v. Baltimore, 132 Md. 355, 103 A. 948 (1918). The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that lack of achievement in school could be attributed to laziness or lack of
educational opportunity. 578 F.2d at 544. In addition, the court noted that Hashtani had
achieved above average grades in arithmetic and science shortly before his accident. Id. at
545.
" In Graham v. Sandhill Power, Co., 189 N.C. 381, 127 S.E. 429 (1925), the North
Carolina Supreme Court permitted a fourteen year old child, who was proven by expert and
nonexpert testimony to have had a mental age of eight to ten years of age at the time of his
accident and to have inherited insanity, to waive the age limitation on the attractive nuisance
doctrine because of mental deficiency. 189 N.C. 381, 127 S.E. at 431-32. The Hashtanicourt
reasoned that the level of proof offered in Graham, was a minimum standard against which
Hashtani's proof of mental deficiency should be measured. See 578 F.2d at 545. Since Hashtani's evidence of mental deficiency was ambiguous in comparison to clear evidence of mental
deficiency in Graham, the Hashtani court concluded that Hashtani had not sufficiently
rebutted the presumption that a fourteen year old child can understand dangerous conditions.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
22 578 F.2d at 545.
2 Id. Hashtani's psychiatrist testified on the basis of a twenty minute interview with
Hashtani conducted just before the trial, eight years after the accident. Id.; see note 20 supra.
The court also noted that Hashtani's psychiatrist was very hesitant at trial to make an
estimation of Hashtani's mental age at the time of the accident. 578 F.2d at 545. In light of
the medical testimony introduced in Graham, Hashtani's medical evidence was insufficient
to overcome the presumption of ability to appreciate dangerous conditions. Id. at 545-46; see
note 20 supra.

670

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

received a directed verdict.?
Although several courts besides North Carolina recognize age based
limitations on the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine and grant
waivers of the limitation because of a plaintiff's mental deficiency, " the
majority of jurisdictions have rejected the entire concept of an age based
limitation.?5 This rejection is recognized in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts which states that modern society presents many dangers which an
immature adolescent may not be expected to understand although an
adult will be expected to understand the dangers. 6 In addition, age based
presumptions of a child's ability to understand dangerous conditions are
criticized as being arbitrary and lacking in empirical support.? The Restatement does recognize, however, that some limitation is needed upon
the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine.2 8 Thus, the Restatement advocates the use of a sliding scale limitation which would increase
the amount of dangerous conditions which a child is expected to understand as his age increases. 2 In considering whether the attractive nuisance
doctrine applies to a particular child, age will be only one of several factors,
including mental ability, which a jury should consider in deciding whether
the child needs the special protection of the attractive nuisance doctrine. 0
Regardless of the validity of the Restatement criticism of an age based
limitation on the attractive nuisance doctrine, the Erie doctrine31 prevents
the Fourth Circuit from challenging the validity of the North Carolina
limitation.2 Thus, since all the states within the Fourth Circuit are in
" 578 F.2d at 545-46.
21 E.g., Empire Dist. Elec. Co. v. Harris, 82 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1936); Garrett v. Arkansas
Power & Light Co., 218 Ark. 575, 237 S.W.2d 895 (1951); Hollman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892 (1942); Grant v. Mays, 204 Va. 41, 129 S.E.2d 10 (1963); White
v. Kanawha City Co., 127 W. Va. 566, 34 S.E.2d 17 (1945).
21RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339, Comment c (1965). See, e.g., Skaggs v. Junis,
27 Ill. App. 2d 251, 169 N.E.2d 684 (1960); Hoff v. Natural Refining Products Co., 38 N.J.
Super. 222, 118 A.2d 714 (1955).
"6Id. Several courts have recognized that electrical cables present a modem danger
which children should not be expected to understand. See, e.g., McKiddy v. Des Moines Elec.
Co., 202 Iowa 225, 206 N.W. 815 (1926); Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N.C. 381, 127
S.E. 429 (1925).
Prosser, Trespassing Children, supra note 1, at 440-41.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 339, comment c (1965).
2Id.
'" O'Keffe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal. 2d 729, 414 P.2d 830, 51 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1966), citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
32 See generally, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); C. WoHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL
CouRrs § 55 (3d ed. 1976).
32 In a diversity suit, a federal court must apply state law, either under a state statute
or as determined by the highest court of the state. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Only when there is an absence of state action on the matter may a federal court be free to
consider other data in determining what the applicable law of the state might be. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The Fourth Circuit cannot undertake such an investigation because each state supreme court within the circuit has considered the question. See
notes 12-14 supra.
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accord with the North Carolina limitation, a child fourteen years old or
older most likely will be denied the benefit of the attractive nuisance doctrine unless he can prove the existence of a severe mental deficiency.,
Only by state court action or state legislative action can such a child
receive the protection which a majority of courts in other jurisdictionsu
have granted to children over the age of fourteen years
who have been
35
injured by the dangers of modem technological society.
WARREN L. JERVEY

B. Sovereign Immunity
Although based on the rationale that "the King can do no wrong,"I the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity survived the American rejection of the English monarchy in the eighteenth century. 2 Historically,
American courts applying this doctrine prohibited suits against governmental entities, particularly the federal government. 3 The prohibition remained until congressional action in the form of the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA)l in 1946 sanctioned recovery against the federal government
3 See

text accompanying note 24 supra.
3 See note 25 supra.
See note 32 supra.

W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENrARmES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 254 (15th ed. 1809); 3 W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 458-59 (3d ed. 1927). The maxim that "the King can
do no wrong" evolved from the notion that, as chief of the feudal system, no court superseded
the King's authority. When feudalism passed to king-state rule, the cloak of immunity covered that ruling body as well, and the maxim came to mean that the sovereign could do no
wrong. In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1904), Justice Holmes developed
the formulation that sovereign immunity meant "there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Today's meaning of the doctrine
is simply that the federal government cannot be sued without its permission. 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, JR., THE LAw OF TORTS 1609-10, § § 29.2-.3 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER &
JAMES].

2 See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The FederalTort Claims Intentional Torts Amendment: An InterpretiveAnalysis, 54 N.C.L. REv. 497, 507-08 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Boger,
Gitenstein & Verkuil].
See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949); United States
v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 151, 154, 8 Pet. 436, 444 (1834); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 82, 86, 6 Wheat.
264, 380 (1821). Until the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946, special
congressional legislation was the only method of obtaining federal compensation for torts by
federal agents. Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, 9
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 311, 321-26 (1942). Beginning with its first session, Congress allowed
individuals to appeal for relief and passed special bills to compensate these parties. Id. at
311-12. Naturally, this imposed a serious burden on the members of Congress as the number
of appeals increased. Id.
I Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946). The original version of
the FTCA permitted recovery against the government for the negligent actions of its employees and also for the intentional torts of invasion of privacy and trespass. See Boger, Gitenstein
& Verkuil, supra note 2, at 518. The amended version of § 2680(h) applied all FTCA provi-
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for the negligent torts of its agents.5 This legislation, however, did not
abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity where intentional torts were
involved.
No federal recovery for the opprobrious actions of federal officers existed until the 1971 Supreme Court ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics.I Under Bivens, victims
of constitutional wrongs committed by federal agents may maintain damage suits against those agents directly under the fourth amendment.7
While federal officers carry no absolute official immunity,8 the Second
Circuit on remand held in Bivens that a good faith belief in the legality of
their actions would absolve the individual officers of any civil liability?
This good faith defense frees federal officers to discharge their duties in
good faith without the fear of financial liability. 10 Broad protection for
sions to any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process or malicious prosecution resulting from the acts or omissions of investigative or law
enforcement officers of the federal government. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976); see note 12 infra.
I Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) to decide suits
arising under the FTCA.
1 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics arrested Bivens for
alleged narcotics violations without first obtaining the necessary search warrants. The agents
manacled him in front of his wife and children, threatened to arrest the whole family and
otherwise used unreasonable force. Id. at 389. Upon arrival at the federal courthouse, Bivens
was interrogated, booked and subjected to visual strip search. Id. Bivens subsequently sued
the agents in federal district court claiming damages for the humiliation, embarrassment and
mental suffering resulting from the agents' conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the suit on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 38990.
7 Id. at 397. In allowing claims against officers under the fourth amendment, the Court
relied on language in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), to the effect
that essential to civil liberty is the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws for any injury. 403 U.S. at 397. This right entitles a party to recover money damages for
any injury inflicted by governmental violations of the fourth amendment once a cause of
action has been established under that amendment. Id.
A Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972). While the doctrine of official immunity originated from the principles underlying sovereign immunity, the two doctrines must be distinguished. Sovereign
immunity simply protects the government from suit. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 1, at 160910. Official immunity, on the other hand, protects the government officials from personal
liability for wrongs committed in the course of their employment. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). Official immunity is supported
by the rationale that the fear of damage suits should not hinder government officials in
carrying out their duties. Official immunity takes two forms, absolute and qualified. Absolute
immunity arises upon a judge's determination that an official is not amenable to suit by
virtue of his status and constitutes grounds for dismissal of that suit. See Comment,
Accountability for Government Misconduct: Limiting Qualified Immunity and the Good
FaithDefense, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 938, 940-41, 944, 962 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Accountability
for Government Misconduct]. A qualified immunity attaches only if an official proves that
he is entitled to it. By focusing on the reasonableness and good faith of an officer's belief as
to the validity of his actions, Bivens, in effect, created a qualified immunity for law enforcement officers. See id.; text accompanying notes 58-67 infra.
456 F.2d at 1348.
,0 Id. at 1347-48. The Bivens rationale is premised upon the belief that federal law
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federal officers, however, limits recovery by injured parties due to the
relative ease with which officers can establish good faith. Furthermore,
federal officers may be financially unable to satisfy large judgments." To
ameliorate these effects, section 2680 of the FTCA was amended in 1974
to compensate more adequately the innocent victims of law enforcement
abuses. 2 Rather than drafting an independent comprehensive statutory
provision, Congress relied on judicial legislation, and rendered the government liable for the intentional torts recognized in Bivens. 3 The Senate
committee reviewing the amendment manifested this reliance by stating
enforcement officers should be allowed to perform their duties without fear of redress in the
event such actions may later be deemed unconstitutional. Id. See generally Article, Bivens
and Its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by
Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 531 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bivens and
Its Progeny].
" S. REP. No. 93-469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973) (remarks of Senator Percy).
12 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) provides that
with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the
United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of enactment of this
proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process,
or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law
enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by
law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrest for violations of Federal
law.
The amendment followed the 1973 Collinsville drug raids in which agents of the St. Louis
office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (DALE) mistakenly entered the homes of two Collinsville, Illinois families as part of their campaign against heroin and cocaine dealing. Boger,
Gitenstein & Verkuil, supranote 2, at 501. The DALE officers, armed with pistols and sawedoff shotguns, tied up the citizens and ransacked the houses. Id. at 500-01. These illegal
searches, made without a search warrant, involved outrageous and abusive conduct on the
part of the agents and resulted in property damages and mental distress to the victims. Id.
at 504-05. The injured parties brought suit against the federal agents involved in the raids.
Id. However, the relative ease with which those officers could establish a good faith defense
and the possibility that an officer would have such limited financial resources as to be
judgment-proof potentially left the victims without relief. S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. ConE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2790. Congress reacted by
developing a Justice Department proposal to amend the FTCA in order to make the government responsible for the tortious acts of its officers. See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra
note 2, at 507-17. As originally drafted, the amendment abolished immunity for the individual
acts of all government employees, but was ultimately restricted to investigative or law enforcement officers. Id. at 513.
11The 1974 amendment to the FTCA was part of a bill making significant changes in
various drug law enforcement agencies. Knowing the Administration was anxious for the drug
law enforcement legislation to pass quickly, Senator Ervin appended the FTCA amendment
to that legislation in order to speed its passage through Congress. Accordingly, the amendment passed quickly, receiving little discussion. From the beginning, the Justice Department
and the House and Senate committees considered the proposed amendment from the Bivens
standpoint. They apparently overlooked the fact that Bivens developed solely as a result of
statutory inadequacies. See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 498, 514-17. See
also Federal Tort Claims Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 10439 Before the Subcomm. on
Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); S. REp. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. REP. No. 93-469, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
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that the 1974 amendment was to be viewed as a "counterpart" to Bivens."
The amendment waives sovereign immunity and made the Government
independently liable for damages where Bivens imposed liability upon
the offending officer."5 Reliance on Bivens, however, rendered the amendment inadequate as a means of implementing the policy of wider recovery
by tort victims,"6 since the Bivens remedy had developed only in the
absence of a statutory provision providing a cause of action for constitutional violations by federal officers."
The Fourth Circuit discussed the eitent of the government's liability
under the amended FTCA in Norton v. United States." Specifically, the
court considered whether the amendment allowed the government to assert
the good faith defense available to its officers under Bivens.11 Perceiving
the goal of Congress as providing relief in instances in which federal agents
have immunity, the district court held that the United States could not
avail itself of the good faith defenses asserted by its law enforcement officers.? The district court reasoned that denying relief to plaintiffs by permitting the government to avail itself of the defenses asserted by its agents
would defeat the underlying purpose of the amendment.2' In reversing on
the liability issue, the Fourth Circuit held that "the liability of the United
States under § 2680(h) is coterminous with the liability of its agents under
Bivens. ' '22 Accordingly, the immunity available to a government agent
would likewise absolve the United States from liability to innocent victims.?
The facts in the Norton case are similar to the events which initially
generated interest in amending the FTCA.2 4 In Norton, the FBI and local
detectives, acting on an anonymous telephone tip that Patricia Hearst
could be found in plaintiff s apartment in Alexandria, Virginia, went to the
reported address.25 The plaintiff refused the late night entry into her apart" S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2789, 2791.
15 Id.
11 According to commentators, a more comprehensive bill would have avoided any reliance on Bivens and thus prevented the confusion which resulted from varying interpretations
of that case. As enacted, the amendment fails to define the extent of federal intentional tort
liability. Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 515-16.
11Id. In his dissent in Bivens, Justice Burger suggested a statutory cause of action
providing compensation from the government rather than the judicial legislation created by
Bivens. 403 U.S. at 421-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 613 (1978).
Id. at 391.
Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Va. 1977). In reaching this result the district
court equated the good faith defense with qualified immunity, the application of which is
determined by factual findings. Id. at 145, 149; see note 8 supra.See generally text accompanying notes 57-67 infra.

"1427 F. Supp. at 14 5, 149.

581 F.2d at 393; see note 43 infra.
581 F.2d at 393; see note 12 supra.
24

See note 12 supra.

581 F.2d at 391. Patricia Hearst was a federal fugitive, considered armed and danger-
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ment since the officers had no warrant and her door had no peephole
through which she could ascertain the officers' identity. When the officers
attempted forcible entry, the plaintiff unlatched the door for fear it would
be damaged." The officers entered with weapons drawn and searched the
apartment. Finding no trace of Ms. Hearst, they departed. 7 Based on these
facts, plaintiff brought suit against local law enforcement agents under 42
U.S.C. section 1983,2 while suing the federal agents directly under the'
fourth amendment. Suit against the United States was brought under the
amended FTCA. 21 Both local and federal officers asserted a good faith
defense. The United States asserted two defenses based on the officers'
alleged good faith."
Initially, the government claimed that the actions of its officers were
not "wrongful" under the FTCA because the officers held a good faith belief in the legality of their actions. 3 The government theorized that the imposition of liability upon it, absent corresponding wrongful behavior on
the part of the agents, would be inconsistent with case law prohibiting
strict liability under the FTCA.3 2 Second, under the notion of respondeat
superior, the United States claimed the right to assert any defenses
available to its officers in answer to plaintiff's FTCA claim. 33 The government asserted that the officers' good faith belief in the legality of their
ous. Federal warrants for her arrest were outstanding and a nationwide search was under way.
Id.
Id. at 391-92.
21 427 F. Supp. at 142.
2*

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
" 581 F.2d at 392.
20 427 F. Supp. at 146.
31

Id.

Id. The Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953), held
the government not liable for damages resulting from the explosion of two cargo vessels in
the habor of Texas City, Texas. Finding no instance of negligence or wrongful conduct, the
Court refused to hold the Government strictly liable for engaging in a dangerous activity. In
regard to the FTCA, the Court said:
[T]he Act does not extend to such situations, though of course well known in
tort law generally. It is to be invoked only on a 'negligent or wrongful act or omission' of an employee. Absolute liability, of course, arises irrespective of how the
tortfeasor conducts himself; it is imposed automatically when any damages are
sustained as a result of the decision to engage in the dangerous activity.
Id. at 44. In a similar suit for damages from a sonic boom caused by military planes, absent
any negligence, the Court held that Dalehite was controlling and refused to impose strict
liability against the government. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 798-803 (1972).
31427 F. Supp. at 146-47. Respondeat superior, literally "let the master answer," is the
term used to denote the practice of holding an employer responsible for the actions of an
employee acting within the scope of his employment. J. HENDESON &R. PEARSON, THE TORTS
PRocEss 122-24 (1975).
12
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actions extended to the United States, thereby insulating it from liability.3
In spite of the clear violation of plaintiff's fourth amendment rights by the
agents in Norton, the district court concluded that, under Bivens, no monetary relief could be awarded against the agents if they had acted in good
faith.35 In rejecting the government's initial contention that the agents'
actions were not wrongful, the district court stated that a good faith defense does not obviate the fact that a tort has been committed; it merely
affords the actor a defense to monetary liability. The wrongfulness of the
conduct is not eliminated nor is the perpetrator's responsibility for the act
removed.3 Responding to the government's second argument, the district
court determined that the absence of monetary liability of its offending
officers did not similarly relieve the government of liability for those
37
wrongful acts.
Conceding that the structure of the FTCA, agency principles" and
related case law supported the government's second contention, the district court nonetheless refused to dispose of the case on those grounds.
Instead, the district court gave controlling weight to what it discerned as
congressional intent to waive sovereign immunity in specified instances.39
The government argued that the Senate report" accompanying the amendment indicated Congress' intent to incorporate Bivens in its entirety, including the immunity doctrines espoused therein.4 In disagreeing, the district court interpreted the report as intending to provide victims a remedy
for fourth amendment violations, regardless of the acting officer's motivation. 2 The district court concluded that, under this interpretation, Congress did not intend to permit the United States "to escape liability under
the new statute by retreating behind various defenses that had been created under Bivens. . . ."" Therefore, the district court held that the
427 F. Supp. at 146.
See id. at 145. Summary judgment was denied as to the individual officers because
unresolved factual issues made it inappropriate. Id. at 144-46.
31Id. at 146. The court was not attempting to impose liability without fault. It had
already determined that fault existed and that 'finding was not contested. See id.
Furthermore, conduct which would amount to a tort on the part of other defendants does not
lose its tortious character by virtue of official immunity. Official immunity merely protects
the defendant-officer by absolving him from liability. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF Tors 970 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Regardless of the immunity of the individual
officers, the issue actually concerned whether plaintiff could be compensated under the
FTCA. 427 F. Supp. at 146.
31 See id. at 152.
I A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in
the scope of their employment. Generally, a master has all the defenses open to the servant
who committed the tort for which the master is being sued. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, § 219 (comment C) (1957). Thug, the government claimed the defenses available to
its officers individually on the basis of agency principles. 581 F.2d at 393.
3See
427 F. Supp. at 147.
10S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2789.
" 427 F. Supp. at 149.
1' See id.
See id. at 150, quoting Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 515. The district
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United States was not allowed to assert an immunity defense available to
its officers in a suit arising under the FTCA. 4
In passing on the government's appeal, the Fourth Circuit also treated
the case as one of statutory interpretation. 5 Although the theories advanced in the trial court by the United States could have supported a
finding of no governmental liability,46 the Fourth Circuit refused to base
its decision solely on those grounds.47 Instead, the majority looked to congressional policy at the time the amendment was enacted for interpretive
guidelines. Proceeding within this interpretive framework, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and determined that the government would
incur no monetary liability if its agents had acted in good faith." The cas6
was remanded to the district court for production of evidence on the issue
of good faith.
Since Bivens had established a cause of action against federal law
enforcement officers for their intentional torts, section 2680 was viewed by
Congress as a counterpart to Bivens. But, the Fourth Circuit stated, examination of the legislative history did not clarify the extent of the government's liability under the amendment.49 The history itself indicated only
that the government would absorb the financial liability for its officers'
actions in claims recognized in Bivens 0 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
emphasized that the amendment of the FTCA occurred subsequent to
outrageous conduct by law enforcement officers."' Such timing compelled
the conclusion that governmental liability was not necessarily a remedy for
every constitutional violation, but only for "innocent victims of federal law
enforcement abuses.

'52

The majority further supported its decision by reliance on the principle
of statutory interpretation that "statutes which waive immunity of the
United States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovercourt and the government fundamentally disagreed over interpretation of the language in the
Senate report referring to Bivens that, "this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to

the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity
so as to make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct

that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the
individual Government officials involved)." S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 2789, 2791.
" See 427 F. Supp. at 152. The court granted plaintiff summary judgment action against
the United States on the issue of liability. Id.

See 581 F.2d at 395 n.7.
"Id. at 395 n.8.
,TSee id.
" See id. at 397.
'5

" See id. at 395; Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 515-16. See also Federal
Tort Claims Amendment: Hearings on H.R. 10439 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2789, 2791; S. REP. No. 93-469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).

"

581 F.2d at 395.
See id. at 396.

52See id.; Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 530-31.
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eign. ' '5 3 Imposing liability upon the government regardless of an officer's
good faith defense suggested to the majority a sufficient departure from the
principles of respondeat superior" to impose an undue burden upon the
government." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit refused to extend the government's vicarious liability beyond the liability of its officers and allowed the
government to assert the good faith of its officers as a defense."
In dissenting, Judge Butzner emphasized the Supreme Court's analysis
of the good faith defense of federal officers, which treated that defense as
a qualified immunity." Since this immunity results solely from an official's
status, it does not deny the tort;58 this immunity merely removes monetary
liability. 9 Judge Butzner noted that an officer's immunity had never been
used as a defense by the government in any other instance. While waiving
sovereign immunity, the FTCA amendment did not replace it with any
personal immunity held by an officer. Instead, reasoned the dissent, the
amendment protected both the offending officer and the innocent victim
by providing recourse against the government. In other words, the public
at large pays for officers' mistakes and in turn receives the assurance that
federal officers will faithfully perform their duties." The dissent supported
this result by noting that agency principles preclude a principal's defense
on the basis of an agent's immunity.8
Judge Butzner refused to accept the government's contention that
qualified official immunity and sovereign immunity were interchangeable.12 Sovereign immunity is always absolute and protects the government
from suit unless it expressly consents to be sued.13 Conversely, official
immunity protects an officer in the event that he errs in performing his
duties and assumes that the risk of error is less dangerous than no action
at all.8" Absolute official immunity arises solely from an officer's status,
while qualified official immunity attaches only upon proof by the official
that he is entitled to it." Official immunity, either absolute or qualified,
is personal to the official in the same manner that sovereign immunity is
available only to the government.8 ' In thus distinguishing official and sovSee 581 F.2d at 396-97, citing McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951).
See note 33 supra.
See 581 F.2d at 397.
56 See id.
"

" See id. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-40, 247 (1974), the Court considered
an official's good faith defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a qualified immunity, resting in part
on the rationale that, absent bad faith, subjecting an officer to liability for errors in exercising
the discretion required in his job was particularly unjust. Id. at 239-40; accord, Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 313-22 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
, PROSSER, supra note 36, at 970.

5' 581 F.2d at 397-98.
65 Id. at 398.
" See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(b)(ii) (1957).
62 See 581 F.2d at 398.
See note 8 supra.
6 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974).
See Accountability for Government Misconduct, supra note 8, at 940-44.
6 416 U.S. at 241-42 (official immunity); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353
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ereign immunity, Judge Butzner asserted that the amended FTCA preserved a qualified immunity to federal officers while making the public at
large responsible for mistakes made by those officers in performance of
their duties. This fundamental difference between official and sovereign
7
immunity prohibits the substitution of one for the other in any instance.
The Fourth Circuit's narrow resolution of the issue in Norton is significant because it restricts the remedies available to victims of torts committed by federal officers,. While a need clearly exists for protecting officers
in the performance of their duties, one must question whether that protection should be at the expense of the injured party. The Fourth Circuit's
balancing of individuals' civil rights against the need for the efficient
operation of government potentially fails to protect adequately the individuals' rights."8 Under Norton, an individual harmed by a federal officer
may be without any recourse. Thus, the injured parties are placed in
essentially the same position they were in prior to the amendment; had
Congress intended such a result, the FTCA need not have been amended.69
Determining the essential purpose of the FTCA amendment produced
the major point of conflict between the district court and the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit criticized the district court for relying heavily on
a memorandum from the Senate Committee on Government Operations
insisting that the amendment did not allow the government to assert any
defenses available to its agents. The memorandum, however, was not
(1907) (sovereign immunity). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(b)(ii) (1957)
(fact that agent has immunity provides no defense for principal); Accountability for Government Misconduct, supra note 8, at 940-46.
n 581 F.2d at 398.

See Bivens and Its Progeny, supra note 10, at 542-43.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Norton denies effect to the FTCA amendment. Prior
to Bivens, no recovery existed for the tortious acts of federal officers upon innocent persons.
See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 510. Bivens established a cause of action
against federal officers; however, if the officer had acted in good faith, he was immune to
suit and victims were again left unsatisfied. See Accountability for Government Misconduct,
supra note 8, at 971. Section 1346 of the FTCA established a claim against the government
for the tortious acts of its officers, but § 2680(h) excepted certain intentional torts from
coverage, thereby preserving sovereign immunity to the United States. See Federal Tort
Claims Act, Chap. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1965));
note 13 supra. The FTCA amendment provided an exception to the § 2680(h) exception, and
placed certain intentional torts back within the gamut of § 1345. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
Norton simply reinstates the government's sovereign immunity if the officer's action was in
good faith. Therefore, if an officer acts in good faith, although violating someone's constitutional rights, neither he nor the government can be held financially liable.
70 See 581 F.2d at 396. The Senate Committee on Government Operations clarified the
proposed FTCA amendment in a memorandum on legislation to repeal the no-knock laws.
Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 514 & n.82, citing Senate Comm. on Gov't
Operations, Memorandum on No-Knock Legislation, Aug. 28, 1973 at 4, copy on file in the
University of North Carolina Law library. Although the district court could not obtain a copy,
it relied on this memorandum in interpreting the FTCA Amendment. The court quoted
portions of the memorandum as found in the Boger, Gitenstein, & Verkuil article. 427 F.
Supp. at 150. The memorandum was never made part of the legislative history, a point the
Fourth Circuit found inexplainable in light of the commentators' contention that the memorandum was conclusive as to congressional intent. 581 F.2d at 396 n.11.
"

',
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made part of the legislative history and the district court was unable to
secure a copy of it, relying instead upon a commentary for proof of both
its existence and contents.7 ' The majority thought the memorandum improper authority owing to its unavailability. Though perhaps valid, this
criticism from the Fourth Circuit failed to address the issue. Even if misplaced, the weight accorded the memorandum by the district court did not
alter the basic policy behind the FTCA amendment. The Fourth Circuit's
criticism did not camouflage its attempt to sidestep the intended result of
the amendment. In fact, Senate Report 93-588, on which the Norton majority relied, states that the amendment's purpose is to "provide a remedy
against the United States for the intentional torts of its investigative and
law enforcement officers. 7 2 Since the legislative history shows that Congress intended to grant a remedy for Bivens-type torts,7" regardless of the
agents' good faith intentions, the district court and the dissent in Norton
appear correct. The Fourth Circuit, however, analyzed the amendment
as providing an action against the government only in cases of outrageous
law enforcement abuses without specifying any criteria for determining
outrageous abuses.75 To the contrary, the legislative history suggests that
the government's liability was intended to be much broader. The Senate
Committee's explanation of the amendment denoted the government's
independent liability even in such borderline cases as trespass and invasion of privacy." Thus, the governmental liability appears to be intended
for the tortious acts of federal officers enumerated in section 2680, regardless of the officers' individual liability. While making the amendment
dependent upon Bivens, the Senate Committee report did not equate the
government's liability with the agents' nor did it equate their immunities
as does the Fourth Circuit's holding." Instead, the amendment made the
United States independently liable in any situation in which a federal
officer commits a tort while carrying out his regular duties, 9 assuring
compensation to injured parties."0
Allowing the government, to invoke the defenses of its officers would
preclude recovery in instances where the offending agent is not amenable
to suit. Suits against the government would be permissible only if a suit
were maintainable against an agent. Essentially, plaintiffs could obtain
financial recovery from the government only in successful suits against
agents who are judgment proof due to lack of funds. This limitation would,
"

581 F.2d at 396 n.11.

72 S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (1973).

" See id. at 3. The report notes that a Bivens remedy alone is "rather hollow" as federal
officers are frequently judgment-proof. Id.
11See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 538, 540-41. See also S. REP. No.
588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1973).
See 581 F.2d at 396.
7'See S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1973).
See id.
Th581 F.2d at 395.
, See S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1973).
" See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 2, at 537.
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in effect, repeal the amendment, and would deny a remedy in cases where
recovery was clearly intended.
Although Congress possibly intended only to provide tort victims a
"deep pocket" when its agents lacked the funds necessary to satisfy a
judgment, the unqualified waiver of sovereign immunity for constitutional
torts indicates that the amendment should have an even broader scope.8'
Furthermore, if Congress intended only to provide plaintiffs an adequate
recovery from "judgment proof" federal officers, a more direct method
would have been a statute guaranteeing the satisfaction of the agents'
liability rather than an amendment creating independent governmental
liability. Accordingly; since the legislative history gives no indication that
a narrow reading of the statute is required, a liberal reading would better
carry out its intended purpose.
BErsy M. CALLIcoTT
, See id. at 512, 539.

